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Abstract – In this review we aim to facilitate closer contact 
between animal behaviour and robotics. In recent years 
cognitive psychology and cognitive ethology became 
interested in the mental mechanisms controlling the animal 
mind. However, this theoretical interest is hampered by 
several methodological problems. Interactive robots can 
offer a novel way to investigate cognitive skills in animals. It 
may be useful to construct robots that are specifically 
designed to interact with animals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There have been two main driving forces for studying 
animal behaviour by the means of scientific tools. First, 
the field on comparative psychology (e.g. [1]) emerged at 
the end of the 19
th
 century, in which animals were used 
instead of humans to investigate basic questions on the 
mechanisms of learning. At that time the flexible and 
enormously powerful learning abilities of humans were 
seen as a specific feature discriminating man from 
animals. Somewhat paradoxically, however, since 
humans turned out to be too complex and tiresome for 
laboratory investigations, researchers focused on a few 
animals that could be kept in the laboratory (e.g. rats, 
Rhesus monkeys, dogs, cats [2]). It was just unfortunate 
that the success with describing the phenomena of 
learning in terms of stimulus-response patterns (e.g. ‘laws 
of effect’ [2]) decreased interest in rich mental processes 
because the majority of scientists of that time e.g. [3] 
believed (and some still believe) that robust associative 
behaviour models have the power to explain most if not 
all mental processes in animals. Furthermore such 
investigations on learning are constrained to a very 
limited experimental setting (e.g. Skinner box, in which 
the rat learns to push a treadle with its paw) in which the 
action of the animal becomes only an indirect marker for 
the mental events (for further discussion see [4]). 
Researchers like Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen (and 
many others) who had training as zoologists had a quite 
different aim when they got interested in the study of 
animal behaviour. Their most important insight was that, 
generally speaking, (substantial part of) the behaviours of 
an animal species (e.g. eating habits, courtship behaviour 
etc.) were as typical features as its morphological 
peculiarities. However, they soon realised that the study 
of behaviour was methodologically quite different from 
the study of morphology, so the discipline called 
ethology emerged (‘ethos’ – habit/character + ‘logos’ – 
science). The close study of species specific behaviours 
like courtship or aggression naturally led to the issue of 
how to deal with the problem of instinct e.g. [5]. One 
possible solution was describe this mental phenomenon 
in a species specific dichotomy of the ‘sign stimulus’ and 
the ‘fixed action pattern’. The former notion indentified a 
simple or complex part of the environment that controlled 
the emergence of the behaviour, while the later was 
characterised as being dependent on the former, and 
relatively free from other environmental influences. 
Although in general the concepts of early comparative 
psychologists and early ethologists shared many common 
features (both neglected to study the role of the ‘mind’ in 
behaviour, and stressed the role of environmental 
stimuli), they got into heavy debate on the significance of 
individual experience (‘learning’) in the emergence of 
behaviour. Supported by their observations in the 
laboratory, comparative psychologists argued that 
behaviour emerges as an individual response to 
environmental challenges. On the contrary, ethologists 
(working in an evolutionary framework) underlined the 
role of genetic factors [6]. 
Although the waves of the debate are today 
considerably smaller, and both parties mutually agree that 
both inherited and environmental factors play a role in the 
emergence of most behaviours, this reconciliation in itself 
had not brought us much closer in the understanding of 
behaviour control in general. 
II. COGNITIVE APPROACH TO BEHAVIOUR 
In the psychological literature the ‘rediscovery’ of the 
human mind in the 1950s is often referred to as a 
‘revolution’, and this was the time for the birth of 
cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychologists 
understand the mind as a dynamic ‘information 
processing system’ in terms of perception, memory, 
decision making, and problem solving ability. Although 
the idea of the mind as an information processing system 
shows some analogies with the computer which became a 
radically new device in those times, in cognitive 
psychology the mind is rather interpreted in terms of 
inner ‘mental states’ like beliefs, intentions, desires etc. 
which does not fit well with the computer metaphor. 
The question on the nature of animal mind was raised 
within the discipline of ethology by the famous American 
zoologist Donald Griffin. The title of his book ‘The 
question of animal awareness’ [7] was a real provocation 
in the face of hard-core ethologists who never thought (or 
dared to think) that the subjects of their behavioural 
observations may also be controlled by similar mental 
processes to that of humans. With cognitive psychology 
becoming slowly interested in the comparative and 
evolutionary studies of apes and monkeys, some 
researchers entertained the idea that mental representation 
of the other’s mental state (mental state attribution) may 
be advantageous for competition in animal groups. 
Gaining advantages by foretelling the other’s next move 
by the means of attributing some knowledge, belief etc to 
the companion (‘Machiavellian intelligence’) became a 
central idea for explaining the evolution of complex 
social cognitive abilities in apes and humans [8]. 
Cognitive ethology is aiming to follow the Darwinian 
tradition to provide an evolutionary and comparative 
study of the animal mind. However, despite strong 
arguments by Alan and Bekoff [9] in favour of cognitive 
ethology, the lack of a widely acknowledged 
methodology convinced main stream researchers that this 
field is infected with subjectivity and aims to study 
elusive mental phenomena [1]. Many, including the 
present authors, still believe that cognitive ethology has 
the potential to provide a unique perspective on the 
animal mind but future research should make goals and 
means more explicit (see below). 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COGNITIVE APPROACH: ARE 
THERE BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR ‘COGNITIVE STATES’? 
Right from the beginning the results of cognitive 
ethologists were looked at with various levels of 
scepticism. One of the most serious critics was Cecilia 
Heyes [10] who was very accurate to point out 
methodological problems with the research. She did not 
have a hard time because cognitive ethologists put the 
stakes quite high: they wanted to show that apes are able 
to attribute mental states to humans or conspecific 
companions. Based on the formal logic of 
‘associationism’ Heyes could efficiently dismantle the 
cognitive interpretations, and provide alternative 
explanations which reduce the phenomena to associative 
processes. Importantly, many associative mental models 
have the power to work in simple computational models 
but there is no proof that all mental phenomena in 
animals can be reduced to an explanation based on 
associative processes. Byrne and Bates [4] and many 
others argue that such models are applied only ‘post hoc’ 
as explanations and this does not imply that they are 
functionally equivalent with the studied phenomenon. 
From the ethologists’ point of view the problem is 
whether cognitive states can be characterised by specific 
behavioural markers which could exclude alternative 
explanations. In other words is there an act or some 
specific combination of acts that stands for mental state 
‘X’ (e.g. ‘seeing’). Such behavioural markers (‘I see 
you’) are easily generated in systems that use language 
because a word can easily become such a label. Actually, 
the problems of interpreting the mind of the preverbal 
infant are comparable to the inquiry about animal mind. 
One quite widely applied approach in infants relies on 
looking time change as a marker for certain mental 
processes (violation of expectation paradigm) [11]. It is 
assumed that infants look longer if they see impossible or 
unexpected events. Researchers using this method claim 
that concepts like object permanence or solidity emerge 
very early in the human infants, but there is an ongoing 
debate about the validity of the basic assumption of the 
paradigm. 
It may be the case that animals or human infants allow 
simply too few input-output states for researchers to find 
out precisely the underlying structure of the mind. In 
other words, our way of measuring these input-output 
relationships is too crude for providing a good estimation 
about the necessary complexity for explaining the mind. 
IV. TWO ‘CLASSIC’ EXAMPLES FOR THE 
INTERPRETABILITY PROBLEM 
In line with the above notion the study of behaviour 
does not provide a straight forward interpretation of the 
mind in terms of cognitive states. Simple mental states 
like ‘intentionality’, which are quite trivial in case of 
adult humans, are a nightmare for those who want a 
waterproof evidence for animals. Although, one can put 
all these efforts aside and accept that animal behaviour at 
a face value resembles human behaviour in terms of goal 
directedness (which is a way of interpreting 
intentionality) but this fails to uncover underlying mental 
mechanisms that in principle could be quite different. 
As mentioned above one way of circumventing the 
problem is to look for behavioural indices of mental 
states. For example, in the case of intentional 
communication researchers studying preverbal human 
infants converge on a list of such behavioural markers 
(criteria) that ‘define’ the presence of an intentional act 
(summarized in [12]). These include social use of signals, 
manipulation of attention, gaze alternation, persistence in 
and elaboration of communicative behaviour. 
Interestingly, this list was recovered from several 
researchers who used only a few criteria, however, it is 
still questionable whether (1) these criteria can be used in 
cross-species comparison, (2) whether some criteria are 
more important than others, (3) whether the lack of one or 
more criteria excludes intentionality, and whether (4) the 
criteria may vary from behaviour to behaviour. 
Research on social learning is particularly interested in 
describing mental mechanisms by the means of which the 
observer is able to utilise third person information for his 
own advantage. If a chicken observes another chicken 
using its leg to push a treadle for obtaining food, it will 
also use this action if it finds itself in the same situation. 
After many years of work most researchers seem to agree 
on four broad categories (mechanisms) of social learning: 
enhancement, observational conditioning, emulation and 
imitation [13]. It is not our intention here to elaborate 
these categories of learning, but to stress that such strict 
separation makes real (natural) situations very difficult to 
interpret. For example, how can we interpret if a dog 
increases its effectiveness of detouring a fence after 
observing an object (e.g. bucket) making a detour around 
one end of the fence? Does learning from an object (a 
box) fulfil conditions of ‘social learning’? Is the dog 
learning about the path, the corner or that ‘corners can be 
circumnavigated’ during the observation? 
Somehow animal (and human) behaviour seems to be 
much richer than expected and linguistic labels seem to 
be providing constrains for the scientific research on 
mental processes. While our everyday words for mental 
phenomena may serve well in interpreting our own or 
others’ behaviour objectively (He wants the banana.) or 
subjectively (I feel he wants the banana.), but they fail to 
be useful for being the building blocks of mental models. 
Defining and providing an existence for a linguistic label 
(e.g. ‘intention’) in the mind of animals seems to be an 
effort in vain. Although research may still advance using 
this paradigm, the time may have come to look for 
alternative ways of investigation. The use of artificial 
agents, collectively referred to as robots, may offer some 
new avenues for future research that aims at studying the 
mind from an ethological perspective. 
V. ETHOLOGY AND ROBOTICS: DIVERGENT HISTORY, 
CONVERGING FUTURE 
Ethological analysis of animal behaviour always relies 
on a functional analysis. This includes the description of 
the particular niche that is inhabited by the species, the 
estimation of the possible challenges of living and the 
behavioural means that support the species’ survival. 
Thus the key question for ethologists is how successfully 
the species manages to live under certain constrains and 
conditions. 
A further important insight is that evolutionary 
interpretations implicate that animal behaviour is the 
result of a process of adaptation. Adaptation does not 
make behaviour perfect, indeed if looked at in isolation 
most behaviour systems underperform. Thus adaptation 
can be seen as a process which drives the animals 
towards a local optimum given many trade-offs in their 
niche. Recent insights in behavioural ecology also 
suggest that the local optimum represents the mean value, 
and individuals in a population may deviate considerably 
from this point. In evolving systems this also allows for 
relatively rapid changes in this optimal mean by altering 
the ratio of individuals with different character within a 
population. 
It is quite unfortunate that such analysis is often 
missing from robotics, and the possible role of the 
environment is not taken seriously. The emergence of 
robots, at least in a general sense of the word, was 
possible after engineers realised that complex working 
processes (e.g. car making) can be divided into small, 
repeatedly performed actions if they can provide a 
constant environment for executing these actions. 
Although contemporary industry robots perform very 
complex tasks with great precision, this is only possible 
because they do not have to bother with any change in the 
environment (because there is no change – at least from 
their perspective). 
Recently engineers have become interested in the 
problem of whether some robots could function in ‘real’ 
environments. It retrospect it seems that they did not take 
the emerging issues seriously, that is, what it really takes 
to move a system from a invariant environment to a 
variable one, in which the recognition and prediction of 
the events becomes a crucial issue. Moreover roboticists 
suggested or at least did not deny that some types of 
robots may be able to share the niche of humans which is 
one of the most complex ones on Earth. This paradox is 
nicely supported by a ‘youtube’ video that shows a 
female android trying to mimic a human smiling gesture 
but the viewer can see that the android moves on a 
wheeled platform, and its whole body is lurching back 
and forward giving the impression of falling over in any 
minute. 
In a famous book on evolution Eörs Szathmáry and 
John Maynard Smith [14] identified five critical steps in 
evolving systems. Humans have passed all evolutionary 
levels in a sequential order. However, it seems that robot 
building starts at the last step of this process as if it 
avoided the ones at lower level. This case is analogous to 
a situation when a novice interested in mathematics wants 
to start with understanding differential equation. In other 
words, robotics should strive for being more realistic. 
Even the word ‘autonomy’ is used in a very different 
meaning in evolutionary biology and robotics, and 
especially in the latter autonomy is used also very 
loosely, that is, in all cases autonomy is restricted to a 
narrow range of functions and does not apply to the robot 
as a whole.  
Importantly this somewhat pessimistic view does not 
suggest that robots have no future! On the contrary, 
present day’s engineers together with other scientists 
should work on elaborating realistic targets for robots of 
our time.  
VI. ANIMALS AS TESTBEDS FOR INTERACTIVE ROBOTS 
Earlier we have implicated that robotics, especially 
social robotics [15] could profit from the study of animal 
behaviour [16]. More particularly, we have argued that 
robots designed for social interaction with humans could 
be using behavioural patterns which are derived from 
social animals, particularly those which have been 
sharing the life of humans (e.g. dogs). In a series of 
experiments we have provided a methodology how 
detailed observation of human-dog interaction can lead to 
insights for developing more believable social behaviour 
for robots [17]. 
If such robots could be made functional then this 
approach may offer a new possibility for using robots in 
animal-robot interaction. One key question in ethological 
research involves the investigation of environmental 
stimuli (events) that affect and guide behaviour. This 
research agenda was very successful in identifying sign 
stimuli which have an innate basis, control complex 
species specific behaviour, and guide further learning 
about the environment.  
A recent review [18] provided a detailed state of art of 
animal-robot interaction which seems to be an emerging 
new field in the study of animal behaviour. The authors 
listed several ways how robots can be used to investigate 
animal behaviour in a novel way. For example, they can 
replace the handmade replicas of experimental stimuli, 
making these stimuli more lifelike and capable to interact 
with the living organism. Several such experiments were 
carried out with groups of cockroaches and various fish 
species. In these cases the robot was regarded by the 
animals as a conspecific, and in this way allowing 
scientists to manipulate the movement of the group in 
space. In principle, robots could also participate in more 
complex social interactions with animals in different 
situations.  
It is important to note that most of these robots are 
remote controlled either by an assistant directly or by a 
program that determines its behaviour step by step. In 
other words such systems are rarely ‘reactive’, partly 
because their perceptual abilities are limited to assess the 
action of the animal partner. Thus human assistants may 
provide a simple and cheap option to control these robots. 
Nevertheless, roboticists may consider animal-robot 
interaction as a possible scenario for developing their 
robots, and making them more autonomous. Instead of 
using the human as a partner with very complex 
perceptual, behavioural and cognitive skills, animals may 
provide a more realistic target for developing interactive 
robots. In this case robots will not be reduced to a 
‘replica’ of some living being assisting the ethologists in 
their research but the aim would be to make these robots 
as independent (‘autonomous’) as possible in their 
interactions with animals. We believe that the community 
of roboticists should take this opportunity more seriously 
and in addition to helping ethologists in their work, they 
should be a driving force for designing such robots which 
could be on par with animals in certain forms of 
interaction. We claim that the experience gained during 
the design of interactive robots for animals will raise 
problems and ideas which eventually help to develop 
more believable robots for humans. 
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